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Jinja City Mayor Kasolo, Bell Avenue Jinja City, Jinja City (2026)

24/05/2026

Why entrepreneurship is the main path out of Uganda’s youth underemployment

By Kasolo Okocha

Uganda has one of the youngest populations in the world. 78% are under 30, and 22 million are aged 18-35. Every year ∼400,000 youth enter the job market. The formal sector creates maybe 30,000-50,000 jobs annually.

That gap is why “underemployment” is the real problem: graduates driving boda bodas, degree holders doing casual work, people working 20 hours a week when they want 40. Government jobs and large firms can’t absorb this number. Entrepreneurship is the only route that can scale fast enough.

Here’s why:

The formal job market is too small
Uganda’s economy is 80% informal. Big companies, NGOs, and government can’t hire millions. The public sector is capped by the wage bill. Manufacturing and services are growing, but slowly.

Entrepreneurship flips the model: instead of waiting for a job, youth create micro-businesses, SMEs, and digital ventures that employ themselves and others. One boda boda owner with 3 bikes becomes an employer. One agro-processor with a small mill hires 5 people.

Uganda has low barriers to start small
You don’t need millions to start in Uganda.

Mobile money and MTN/Airtel mobile money APIs let you run a business from a phone.

Agriculture, retail, food processing, repair services, and digital gigs have low entry costs.

Social media and WhatsApp cut marketing costs to near zero.

This matters because most youth don’t have capital for big ventures, but they can start small and reinvest.

Demography + tech = opportunity

Uganda’s youth are digital natives. Mobile pe*******on is 75%, internet pe*******on 45% and rising. That opens doors for:

Agri-tech: selling produce via apps, cold chain rentals, small-scale irrigation.

Digital services: graphic design, video editing, data entry for global clients.

Local services: laundry, food delivery, event decoration, repair work.

These jobs don’t exist in government hiring plans, but they exist in the market if someone creates them.

Policy is finally catching up
The government has rolled out programs aimed directly at youth-led business:

Parish Development Model (PDM): 100m UGX per parish per year, channeled to SACCOs for youth and women groups.

Emyooga: seed capital for sector-specific SACCOs like welders, tailors, market vendors.

Youth Livelihood Programme: loans for group enterprises.

None of these are perfect - corruption and late disbursement are real issues. But the shift is clear: the state is betting on self-employment, not mass public hiring.

It builds resilience against shocks
When COVID hit, formal jobs collapsed. But youth running small shops, mobile money agencies, and online reselling kept cash flowing. Entrepreneurship diversifies income streams. A graduate with a small poultry unit + freelance design work is less vulnerable than one waiting for a single job offer.

It changes the mindset problem
The biggest bottleneck isn’t capital. It’s the expectation that “a job” means a government or NGO contract. Entrepreneurship forces youth to identify problems around them and solve them for profit. That shift - from job seeker to problem solver - is what creates long-term employment.

The catch: entrepreneurship alone isn’t magic

For it to work, 3 things need fixing:

Skills: Most youth leave school without practical business or technical skills. TVET and hands-on training matter more than more theory.

Access to affordable capital: 18-24% interest from banks kills small business. PDM and Emyooga help, but scale is still low.

Market access: Youth can produce, but linking to buyers, export markets, and formal contracts is hard.

Where those 3 align, you see real movement. Places like Gulu, Mbale, and parts of Kampala have youth running profitable agri-businesses, welding shops, and digital hubs because they got training + startup capital + a market link.

Thd bottom line is, Uganda can’t employ 400,000 youth a year through government hiring. It can if 10% of those youth start businesses that employ 2-3 others each. That’s how entrepreneurship solves underemployment - not by replacing formal jobs, but by creating thousands of small engines of employment the formal sector never will.

Want me to break down 3 sectors in Uganda right now where a youth with 500k UGX can realistically start and make profit in 6 months?

End
Jinja City Mayor Kasolo ,
The London School of Economics and Political Science - LSE

22/05/2026

THE POLITICAL KINGS OF AFRICA:
How Museveni, Biya and Ouattara Hold Power in 2026

As H.E Yoweri Museveni begins his seventh term in Uganda, he joins a small club of African leaders who have turned decades in office into a distinct style of rule. Alongside Paul Biya of Cameroon and Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire, Museveni shows how modern African “political kings” hold power without crowns.

All three won re-election in the last 18 months. All three are over 80. And all three face the same question: how do leaders who came to power in the 1980s and 1990s still dominate in an Africa where 70% of the population is under 30?

Legitimacy from the past, control in the present, President Museveni came to power in 1986 after a five-year bush war. For Ugandans over 35, he is the man who ended Amin and Obote-era chaos. That “liberator” status still matters.

Biya, 93, has ruled Cameroon since 1982. He positioned himself as the guarantor of stability after a single-party era and early multiparty turbulence.

While Ouattara, 83, returned Côte d’Ivoire to constitutional rule after the 2010-2011 civil war. He frames himself as the technocrat who restored economic growth.

In modern Africa, where institutions are weak, historical legitimacy often outweighs policy platforms. It gives these leaders a narrative that challengers lack Control of the security and electoral machinery.

None of the three rely on the army alone. They use law, bureaucracy, and security to manage political space.

Museveni’s Uganda Police and UPDF regularly block opposition rallies under the Public Order Management Act. The 2026 election saw tanks deployed in Kampala before inauguration.

Biya’s administration uses administrative detention and restrictive protest laws to limit opposition marches in Yaounde and Douala.

Ouattara’s government controls the Independent Electoral Commission and has kept key security posts with loyalists since 2011.

Elections happen, but the rules, timing, and policing favor incumbents. Opposition parties call it “managed competition.”

All three run patronage systems that tie local leaders to the center.

In Uganda, funds for the Parish Development Model and Emyooga flow through NRM structures. Defecting to NRM often means access to contracts and appointments.

In Cameroon, public jobs and contracts are distributed through CPDM networks. In Côte d’Ivoire, Ouattara’s RHDP uses infrastructure projects and party patronage to keep regional bosses loyal.

When state resources are the main source of development money, staying outside the ruling party becomes politically expensive.

The three Political Kings have all faced strong individual challengers, but never a united front.

In Uganda, Bobi Wine’s NUP got 24.72% in January 2026, but the opposition remains split between NUP, FDC and others.

In Cameroon, opposition parties have failed to coalesce around one candidate for three election cycles.

In Côte d’Ivoire, the opposition is divided between Gbagbo loyalists and PDCI moderates.

Without unity, the incumbents win with 60-70% of the vote even when turnout is low.

These leaders are not stuck in 1986, President Museveni’s team runs aggressive online campaigns on TikTok and X. The 2026 election was fought as much in memes and livestreams as on the ground.

Ouattara sells Côte d’Ivoire as a West African growth hub, attracting investors and using economic data as political armor.

Biya relies on state media and quiet elite management, avoiding large rallies but maintaining control through party structures.

They have adapted to social media, debt markets, and donor politics while keeping the core levers of power intact.

Constitutional flexibility is another tool mastered and used where Term limits have fallen in all three countries. Uganda removed age limits in 2017. Côte d’Ivoire changed its constitution in 2016. Cameroon has no term limits.

Each change was passed by parliament, giving the extensions a legal veneer. Opposition groups call it “constitutional manipulation.” Supporters call it “respecting the people’s choice.”

Why do I say there “kings” and it fits the description, A king rules through a mix of historical legitimacy, control of force, control of resources, and the absence of a credible alternative.

Museveni, Biya and Ouattara don’t rule by decree alone. They rule by keeping elections, parliaments and courts in place, but structuring them so that losing is rare and costly.

In 2026, Africa has more elections than ever. But it also has more leaders who treat the presidency like a lifetime role.

Museveni’s term runs to 2031. Biya and Ouattara have signaled no clear exit. For their opponents, the problem is not just beating them at the ballot box. It’s beating a system built to outlast them.

The question now: Will Africa’s young voters accept another decade of the same, or will 2030 bring the first real succession test for this generation of long rulers?

By Okocha Jinja City Mayor Kasolo
Political Science Student.
The London School of Economics and Political Science - LSE

19/05/2026

Uganda’s Political Stasis: Legitimacy, Institutions, and the Developmental State in Middle Age

A Political Theory Analysis, 2026
Peter Jinja City Mayor Kasolo

Introduction

Uganda’s 2026 general elections confirmed Yoweri Museveni’s seventh term and an NRM parliamentary majority of 359 out of 529 seats. On the surface, this signals stability. Beneath it lies a deeper political problem: a regime that has preserved peace and growth for four decades now faces a crisis of legitimacy, institutional capture, and generational mismatch.

Using Max Weber’s typology of authority, Plato’s analysis of regime decay, and Acemoglu & Robinson’s framework of extractive vs inclusive institutions, this paper argues that Uganda’s politics is at a fork. One path leads to managed stagnation through patronage and coercion. The other requires a negotiated shift toward inclusive institutions. The choice made between 2026 and 2031 will determine whether Uganda transitions peacefully or experiences rupture.

1. The Erosion of Legitimacy: From Performance to Charisma and Force

Max Weber identifies three pure types of legitimate authority: legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic. For most of its tenure, the NRM government relied on _output legitimacy_ - authority justified by results. The claim was simple: “We ended the war, restored macro-stability, and built roads.” For voters in rural Uganda, this claim held weight.

That legitimacy is now strained. The 2026 elections saw turnout fall to 52.50%, down 6.85 percentage points from 2021. Museveni won 71.65% of the vote, but the decline in participation reflects apathy and skepticism, especially among voters born after 2000 who have no memory of the bush war.

Simultaneously, the legal-rational basis of authority has weakened. Constitutional amendments removing age and term limits, the use of military units in civilian policing, and repeated arrests of opposition figures shift the basis of rule toward charisma and coercion. This fits Weber’s warning: when legal-rational authority erodes, rulers lean on charisma. But charisma is volatile and non-transferable.

Plato’s analysis in _The Republic_ Book VIII is relevant here. He argues that regimes decay when the ruling class substitutes appetite for honor and reason. Uganda’s trajectory from a “broad-based” timocracy in 1986 to an oligarchy where access to state resources depends on loyalty mirrors this. Once performance falters, a regime without legal-rational grounding has no buffer.

2. Institutional Capture and the Problem of Delegation

Uganda does not lack institutions. Parliament meets, courts rule, and the Electoral Commission administers elections. The problem is what Guillermo O’Donnell termed _delegative democracy_: institutions exist but delegate effective power to the executive and are weak in holding it accountable.

Three examples illustrate this:

1. Parliament: With 359 NRM MPs, the legislature functions more as an extension of the executive than a check on it. Debates over bills like the Magistrates Courts Amendment Bill 2026 focus on technical efficiency, but larger questions of executive overreach receive limited pushback.

2. Judiciary: Landmark rulings on rights and procedure are issued, but enforcement is inconsistent when judgments conflict with security interests. This creates what Linz called “low-intensity rule of law.”

3. Electoral Commission: Technically independent, but public trust is low. Opposition leader Joel Ssenyonyi of NUP argues that the playing field is structurally tilted.

The intellectual problem is principal-agent failure. Citizens are the principals, but MPs, EC officials, and security commanders are accountable upward to the presidency, not downward to voters. Acemoglu & Robinson argue that such _extractive institutions_ persist because they concentrate power and rents in a narrow elite. They generate growth under certain conditions, but not inclusive development.

3. The Developmental State in Middle Age: Three Contradictions*

Uganda’s post-1986 model fits what scholars call a “developmental patrimonial state.” The state used central control to maintain peace and macroeconomic stability while distributing rents to maintain a ruling coalition. Between 1990 and 2015, GDP grew at an average of 6.5% annually.

That model now faces three contradictions:

Rent-seeking vs Productivity

Patronage keeps the coalition intact, but inflates procurement costs and crowds out private investment. The oil sector, set to begin production, is the critical test. If oil revenues become another rent pot, Uganda risks the “resource curse” that undermined Nigeria and Angola.

Elite Aging vs Youth Bulge

78% of Ugandans are under 30. The average age of cabinet ministers is over 55. The ideological language of liberation and “peace” resonates less with a generation facing 83% youth underemployment. The rise of NUP and the People’s Front for Freedom reflects this generational shift. This is not just party competition; it is a clash of political generations.

Centralization vs Federal Pressure

Cultural institutions like Buganda and Rwenzururu increasingly demand autonomy over cultural and land matters. Rwenzururu King Charles Wesley Mumbere instructed his cabinet to declare political ambitions before 2026 to avoid mixing kingdom and partisan politics. Central government resists formal federalism, fearing disintegration. The unresolved question is whether Uganda can decentralize without weakening the state.

4. Path Dependency and the Possibility of Transition

Acemoglu & Robinson argue that societies get locked into path-dependent trajectories. Extractive institutions create a feedback loop: power generates wealth, wealth secures power, and reform becomes unlikely without external shock. Uganda’s history confirms this pattern. Transitions in 1966, 1971, and 1986 all came through violence.

The intellectual challenge for 2026-2031 is whether Uganda can shift to _inclusive institutions_ through evolution rather than rupture. This requires three conditions:

1. Elite Pact-Making*: Can segments of the ruling elite and opposition agree on new rules of the game? Kenya’s 2010 constitutional process shows this is possible, but it requires elite recognition that the current equilibrium is unsustainable.
2. Civic Agency*: Civil society, media, and religious institutions must raise the cost of electoral abuse and corruption. The 2024 anti-corruption protests showed this potential, but sustainability depends on protection of civic space.
3. Structural Economic Change*: A middle class created by agro-industry, services, and oil must demand accountability. History shows that middle classes rarely accept purely extractive politics once their interests are at stake.

Plato’s later work in _The Statesman_ and _Laws_ offers a pragmatic insight here. He concedes that the philosopher-king is rare, so the second-best is rule of law. Uganda’s challenge is to make law a constraint on power, not a tool of power.

5. Conclusion: Stasis or Transition*

Uganda in 2026 is not a failed state. It is a _stalled state_. It has avoided collapse but not achieved transformation. The core argument is this:

If politics remains a contest over control of the state for patronage, Uganda will experience managed stagnation. If politics becomes a contest over how to make the state serve citizens, Uganda can transition.

The first path is probable. The incentives for the current elite favor continuity. The second path requires a shift in elite incentives, more effective youth organization beyond protest, and a re-legitimation of institutions through performance and fairness.

The 2026-2031 term is therefore pivotal. It will test whether Uganda’s political class can rewrite the rules before demographic and economic pressures force a rewrite by force.

14/05/2026

THANK YOU, JINJA CITY

As I conclude 5 years of service as your Mayor, I want to express my deepest gratitude to the people of Jinja City.

To the residents, market vendors, boda boda riders, teachers, clergy, elders, youth, and business community – thank you for your trust, your patience, and your partnership. You held me accountable, shared your ideas, and worked beside me to make Jinja City cleaner, safer, and more vibrant.

To my fellow leaders – the City Council, technical team, RCC, security organs, and cultural leaders – your dedication made every project possible.

To my family and the faith community – your prayers and support carried me through the toughest days.

Together we tarmacked roads, lit streets, supported schools, and put Jinja City on the tourism map. The progress belongs to all of us.

Though my term ends, my love for Jinja City does not. I remain your servant and your neighbor.

Mwebale Ihno. Thank you.
Okocha Kasolo Peter
Mayor, Jinja City 2021-2026

13/04/2026

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