07/25/2025
Why Cambodia Planting New Landmines Defies Logic
Accusations by Thai authorities that Cambodia deliberately planted new landmines in July 2025, contributing to the deadly escalation on July 24, lack verifiable evidence and defy strategic logic. Such claims, presented without independent corroboration, risk deepening mistrust at a moment when de-escalation is urgently needed. They also obscure more complex geopolitical and domestic dynamics that may be fueling this crisis.
Here I want to examine why the accusations against Cambodia are improbable, addresses reasonable counter-arguments, and explores alternative interests at play, placing the conflict in broader Southeast Asian context.
1. Cambodia’s Legal Strategy Is Incompatible with Provocation
On May 29, one day after a fatal border skirmish near the Emerald Triangle (Chong Bok/Mom Bei), Cambodia announced it would seek a ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on contested zones, including areas near the Preah Vihear Temple. The official petition, filed in mid-June, referenced the ICJ’s 1962 decision affirming Cambodian sovereignty over Preah Vihear .
To plant new anti-personnel mines at that moment would mean:
- Violating the Ottawa Convention, which bans anti-personnel mines and has been ratified by both Cambodia (1999) and Thailand (1998);
- Undermining Cambodia’s own legal posture, which depends on showing restraint and good faith;
- Inviting international condemnation, especially from parties monitoring humanitarian compliance.
Cambodia has a consistent record of preferring adjudication over confrontation—illustrated by its 2011 ICJ appeal against Thailand during the Preah Vihear standoff.
Counter-argument considered: Could rogue actors in Cambodia’s military have acted independently?
Response: While no institution is immune to internal deviation, Cambodia’s mine-clearing operations are centrally managed by the Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC), under civilian oversight. No evidence has surfaced, public or leaked, suggesting rogue mine deployment. Moreover, Thailand has not provided forensic evidence, only internal assessments.
2. No Independent Evidence of “New” Mines—Only Historical UXO
Thailand claims the July 16 and 23 explosions, which injured eight soldiers, involved newly planted Russian-made PMN-2 mines. However:
- No independent verification has been issued by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), ASEAN, or any third-party observer;
- PMN-2 mines were extensively used during Cambodia’s civil war era. Their presence alone is not proof of recent deployment.
According to the Landmine Monitor 2023, Cambodia remains one of the world’s most mine-affected countries, with more than 20,000 casualties since the 1990s. CMAC estimates 4 to 6 million unexploded ordnance (UXO) remain across the country, especially along border areas.
Cambodian officials maintain the blasts occurred on their side of the border and that Thai soldiers had deviated from agreed patrol routes.
Comparable case: In the Myanmar–Thailand border region, recurring mine incidents have triggered similar blame cycles. Third-party verification by NGOs like The HALO Trust has often revealed that the explosives were residual munitions from earlier conflicts—not evidence of recent hostilities.
3. Military and Economic Logic Opposes Escalation
Cambodia has no strategic interest in initiating conflict militarily, economically, or diplomatically.
- Military disadvantage: Thailand’s defense budget exceeds $6.1 billion, while Cambodia’s is just under $1.4 billion. Thai F-16 airstrikes on July 24 underscored its aerial superiority.
- Economic exposure: Cambodia imports over $3.8 billion/year from Thailand—including 30% of its fuel supply. Border closures have already disrupted essential goods, causing sectoral losses estimated in the hundreds of millions .
- Tourism collapse: Thai travelers represented 28% of international arrivals in early 2025. Since the border shutdown, Poipet has been described as “silent,” with up to 1 million tourist losses projected .
Prime Minister Hun Manet has publicly rejected war, stating that Cambodia “did not start, and does not want this conflict.” Mine-laying would amount to strategic su***de, militarily and reputationally.
The absence of a credible motive or verified evidence implicating Cambodia raises the possibility that other actors may be benefiting from the unrest.
4. So Who Gains from Escalation?
A. Transnational Crime Networks
- Cambodia’s border provinces are home to large-scale cyber-scam operations, many with alleged Chinese criminal links.
- In June 2025, Thailand issued threats against scam centers across the border. Since then, over 1,000 suspects have been arrested in Cambodian crackdowns. Some experts argue that tensions help distract authorities, allowing these networks to regroup.
- The illicit scam industry in the region has been estimated at $19–29 billion, making it a powerful force resistant to state interference.
B. Domestic Political Calculations
In Thailand, the military benefits politically amid the suspension of PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra. The media’s shift toward nationalist rhetoric echoes past cycles of civil–military tension.
Speculative but not implausible: A small number of analysts and users online have raised the possibility of a “false flag” operation to justify military mobilization or political shakeups.
5. Regional Lessons and the Path Forward
Southeast Asia has seen similar tensions—Malaysia–Indonesia maritime clashes, Laos–Thailand land disputes, and Myanmar’s border instability. In many cases, third-party mediation, transparency, and early fact-finding prevented escalation.
Recommendations:
- Deploy ASEAN observers to verify mine incidents and assess both sides’ claims;
- Public release of patrol data (GPS logs, maps, radio communications);
- Joint media moratorium on incendiary rhetoric and unverified accusations.
Conclusion: Stop the Spiral Before It Starts
The idea that Cambodia would sabotage its own ICJ case, risk international backlash, and initiate war against a militarily superior neighbor is not supported by facts or logic. Until now, no third-party evidence substantiates Thai claims.
The more likely story is one of opportunists, foreign and domestic, exploiting old wounds for new gains. Civilians are already paying the price: lives lost, economies disrupted, trust eroded.
If Southeast Asia has learned anything from its shared history, it’s this: uncertainty must not become ammunition. Only truth, and restraint, can stop this descent into conflict.
